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COMMENTS
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
V. HIBBS: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN A
STATES' RIGHTS ERA: SWORD OR SHIELD?
Todd B. Tatelman'
The precise operation of federalism in the American system of
government is the "oldest question of constitutional law."' The concept
of sovereign immunity is integral to a full and complete understanding of

this complex debate. The sovereign immunity of the several states,
however, has been a contentious issue since the drafting and ratification
of the Constitution.2 Article III of the Constitution, by its language,

provides for federal court jurisdiction "between a State and Citizens of
another State."' The Eleventh Amendment, however, ratified after both
the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights, removes this jurisdiction
from the federal courts.4

Since the conclusion of the Civil War, the precise scope and meaning
of the Eleventh Amendment and its impact on federal court jurisdiction
have together been the major focal point in the debate concerning

principles of federalism.'

Post-Civil War amendments to the

J.D. Candidate, May 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv.
633, 635 (1993) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992)).
2 See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("It has been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one State to
the citizens of another would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts for
the amount of those securities; a suggestion which the following considerations prove to be
without foundation.").
3. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment states: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
5. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.3 (3d ed. 1999)
(describing competing theories about what the Eleventh Amendment means or prohibits).
Professor Chemerinsky describes the three competing theories of sovereign immunity. Id.
The first theory, supported by the current Supreme Court's "conservative" majority, "sees
the Eleventh Amendment as a restriction on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts that bars all suits against state governments." Id. The second theory, supported by
the remainder of the current Justices, would limit the restriction on subject matter
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Constitution, particularly Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,6

along with a growing federal concern over the civil rights of all citizens,'
have created a tension between the principles of sovereign immunity and
the power of the federal government.8
Starting in 1995, a series of Supreme Court cases has aimed to reduce
this tension. 9 The result has been a severe reduction in Congress's

constitutional authority to provide private rights of action for damages
against state governments.' The Court has yet to adjudicate Congress's
authority to provide such remedies through the Family and Medical

Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). I
This Comment focuses on the tension between the Eleventh
Amendment, which grants states immunity from private damage actions
in federal court, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
jurisdiction only to those cases that are brought exclusively under diversity jurisdiction.
See id. Finally, Professor Chemerinsky indicates that a third theory holds that the
Eleventh Amendment "reinstates the common law immunity from suit enjoyed by states
prior to the adoption of Article III and, perhaps, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia." Id. at n.1; see also Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The
Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1,104-13 (1988); Vicki
C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64
S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 57-60 (1990).
6. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5.
7. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1048 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that before the Civil

War, "the Supreme Court faced relatively few cases involving the Eleventh
Amendment").
& See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at § 7.7 (addressing the question of abrogation
of Eleventh Amendment by Congress).
9. See Timothy S. McFadden, Note, The New Age of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Survey of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudenceand a Review of Kimel
v. Flordia Board of Regents, 27 J.C. & U.L. 519, 519 (2000) (concluding, as the title
suggests, that the decisions by the Court since 1995 have resulted in a "new age in
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, limiting the circumstances in which private lawsuits
for money damages may be brought against states and their arms").
10. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down portions
of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)); Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (striking down portions of the Age Discrimination and
Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (striking down two sections of the Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 666 (1999) (interpreting the Trademark Act of 1946); City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (applying the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act).
11. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54
(2000)).
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authorizes Congress to abrogate that immunity to enforce the antidiscrimination provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Comment
first examines both the language of the two constitutional provisions and
the relevant Supreme Court interpretations of each. This Comment then
examines the series of recent Supreme Court decisions limiting
Congress's Section 5 power. Next, the Comment discusses the FMLA,
exploring the Ninth Circuit's analysis in support of the conclusion that
Congress's extension of full FMLA remedies against the states is a
proper exercise of its Section 5 power. 2 Finally, this Comment
demonstrates that with the development of a pro-states' rights
jurisprudence, the Eleventh Amendment has evolved from a shield
designed to protect the several states from frivolous lawsuits into a sword
employed to thwart federal legislation aimed at protecting citizens' civil
and other rights. This Comment concludes that the FMLA is a
constitutional use of Congress's Section 5 power and that the Eleventh
Amendment's proper place is as a shield protecting the states, not a
sword empowering them to frustrate effectuation of federal legislation
that is well within Congress's power to enact.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

A. The Pre-EleventhAmendment Period:Article III and Sovereign
Immunity
In 1793, shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court heard and decided "its first great case, Chisholm v. Georgia."'3
The issue before the Court in Chisholm was whether a citizen of South
Carolina could bring an action in federal court against the state of
Georgia to collect payment on bonds issued during the Revolutionary
War.1 The Court held, by a four-to-one majority, that the Supreme
Court had jurisdiction and that a judgment of default would enter against
Georgia.15 A majority of the Supreme Court accepted Attorney General

12. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Resources, 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted
sub nom. Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mem.).
13. John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia
(1793), 73 N.C. L. REV. 255,256 (1994).
14. See id.; Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an
Eccentric Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 39 (2001). More precisely, the question was:
"[W]ill an action of assumpit lie against a State?" Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
419, 430 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
15. Orth, supra note 13, at 256. Chief Justice Jay and Justices Blair, Wilson, and
Cushing ruled that there was jurisdiction. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 479 (Jay, C.J.);
id. at 450-53 (Blair, J.); id. at 466 (Wilson, J.); id. at 469 (Cushing, J.). Justice Iredell
dissented on the narrow question of whether there was an action in assumpit against a
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Edmund Randolph's argument that both the "letter" and the "[s]pirit of
the Constitution" gave the Court jurisdiction over the suit.' 6 Article III
of the Constitution clearly extended judicial power to controversies
"between a State and Citizens of another State."" In addition, the
Judiciary Act of 1789 had codified the jurisdiction permitted under
Article III,18 and the Supreme Court had previously exercised jurisdiction
over a suit brought against a state by citizens of foreign nations.' 9
Reaction to the Court's decision in Chisholm was swift and teetered on
the verge of outrage.2 0 The majority of states were concerned not only
with their sovereignty, but also with the financial implications given the
large amount of debt from the Revolutionary War.2 On March 4, 1794,
approximately three weeks after the Court's decision in Chisholm,
Congress enacted, and sent to the states for ratification, what was to
become the Eleventh Amendment.22
B. Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: The Creationof a Broad
Grant of Immunity
During the ninety-five years that followed the ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court heard only one case relating
to the states' sovereign immunity. 3 The case, Cohens v. Virginia,4 was
Chief Justice Marshall's only opportunity to articulate his views on the
meaning, scope, and breadth of the Eleventh Amendment." Marshall, in
state, but he also indicated that he disagreed with the other Justices on the larger question
of jurisdiction. See id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
16. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 420-21.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Attorney General Randolph referred to this textual
basis. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 420. Each of the Justices mentioned it as well. See id.
at 430-31 (Iredell, J., dissenting); id. at 450 (Blair, J.); id. at 466 (Wilson, J.); id. at 466-67
(Cushing, J.); id. at 475 (Jay, C.J.).
18. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.2, at 394 (citing The Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 80, at § 13.).
19. Id. (citing Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 401 (1791)).
20. For example, the state of Georgia enacted a statute holding people attempting to
enforce the Court's decision "to be guilty of felony, and shall suffer death, without the
benefit of clergy, by being hanged." PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 810 (4th ed. 1998); see also
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a ProhibitionAgainst
Jurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1058 (1983).
21. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1058 n.1.14.
22. Id. at 1059. The amendment passed both houses of Congress by overwhelming
majorities. Id. at 1.059 n.121. The House of Representatives approved the proposed
amendment by a vote of 81-9 and the Senate by a vote of 23-2. Id.
23. See Gottesman, supranote 14, at 43.
24. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1823).
25. See Gottesman, supra note 14, at 41-43.
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strengthening the Supreme Court's power to hear cases involving federal
questions, held that "a case arising under the constitution or laws of the
United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be
the parties to that case." 6 Despite Chief Justice Marshall's reading of
the Eleventh Amendment, at the next opportunity to interpret the
language, the Supreme Court opted for a much broader grant of
immunity. 27

In Hans v. Louisiana,28 the Supreme Court was presented with another
dispute involving the obligation of a state to pay its war bond debt.29
Louisiana, refusing to pay interest on its bonds, argued that the
"[p]laintiff cannot sue the state without its permission; the constitution
and laws do not give this honorable court jurisdiction of a suit against the
state." 3 In an attempt to avoid the Eleventh Amendment issue
altogether, Hans responded that Louisiana's refusal to pay the debt was
tantamount to an attempt to impair the validity of a contract."
Therefore, jurisdiction arose because Louisiana violated Article I,
Section 10 of the Constitution.32 The Court, cognizant of the outrage that
erupted after Chisholm, held that the Eleventh Amendment extends
beyond the literal language contained in its text and, therefore, the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. 33

26. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383. Chief Justice Marshall proceeded to narrow
the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment even further by stating that the impetus behind
the language of the amendment was only to relieve the states from the demands made
upon them in federal court, not "to strip the [federal] government of the means of
protecting, by the instrumentality of its Courts, the constitution and laws from active
violation." Id. at 407.
27. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.3, at 397-98 (discussing the holding in Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). Professor Chemerinsky concludes that "since Hans,
states have been immune to suits both by their own citizens and by citizens of other
states." Id. §7.3, at 397. This conclusion creates a larger grant of immunity than that given
by both the original text of the amendment and the decision in Cohens v. Virginia.
28. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 3.
31. See id.
32- See id. Article I, § 10 of the Constitution states:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
33. Hans, 134 U.S. at 21; see also id, at 11 (commenting on the reaction to Chisholm).
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The meaning of Hans is disputed even among the current Supreme
Court Justices. The result is apparently grounded in common law
notions of sovereign immunity combined with the Court's reading of the
"correct" interpretation of Article II. 35 In other words, the Hans Court
relied on the fact that allowing Hans to reformulate his debt claims as the
impairment of contract obligations created the anomalous result that the
Eleventh Amendment was designed to prevent. 6 Therefore, despite the
awkward language of the amendment, a citizen of a state cannot bring
suit against that state in federal court.37 The Court's decision in Hans
resulted in the states enjoying an almost absolute grant of immunity from
federal court jurisdiction.
C. Civil Rights and Congress'sAbility To Abrogate State Sovereign
Immunity
1. Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment: Fitzpatrick and the
Affirmative Grant of Power
After the Court's decision in Hans, Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence went without significant challenge until 1976 when a group
of Connecticut state employees sued the state claiming that "certain
provisions in the state's statutory retirement benefit plan discriminated
against them because of their sex."39 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 0 was the first
34. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.3, at 397-98 (explaining the split within the
current Supreme Court); see also infra note 79 (discussing the split between the Justices
over the meaning of the Hans decision in Seminole Tribe).
35. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.3, at 397; see also Gottesman, supra note 14,
at 43 n.60 (arguing that the Court in Hans overcame the textual problem of the
amendment by "observing that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to reinstate the
original, 'correct' meaning of Article Illof the Constitution, which had been misconstrued
in Chisholm").
36. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 11-12; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.3, at 397;
Gottesman, supra note 14, at 43-44. The Hans Court regarded Chief Justice Marshall's
formulation in Cohens v. Virginia as "unnecessary to the decision, and in that sense extra
judicial, and though made by one who seldom used words without due reflection, ought
not to outweigh the important considerations referred to which lead to a different
conclusion." Hans, 134 U.S. at 20.
37. Hans, 134 U.S. at 21.
38. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.3, at 397. Professor Chemerinsky describes
the majority view on the current Supreme Court as reading the "Eleventh Amendment as
a restriction on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts that bars all suits
against state governments." Id. §7.3, at 396 (emphasis added).
39. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976). The claim relied on the 1972
Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allowed federal courts to
award money damages to private individuals against a state government that discriminated
on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See id. at 447-48 (citing
Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 225, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970
ed. and Supp. IV)).
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case in which a state asserted the Eleventh Amendment as a defense
against a statutory provision enacted by Congress under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.41
The majority opinion, written by then-Justice Rehnquist, cautiously
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment is itself a restriction on state
sovereignty. 4
Therefore, "in determining what is 'appropriate
legislation' . . . [Congress can] provide for private suits against States or
state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts." 43 Specifically, the Court "recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment . .. had fundamentally altered the balance of state and
federal power struck by the Constitution." 44
The decision in Fitzpatrick demonstrates that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides Congress with the authority necessary to abrogate
the sovereign immunity of the states. 45 The majority, however, clearly
invited future litigation when, in a footnote, it reminded states that
Connecticut, in asserting the Eleventh Amendment defense, did "not
contend that the substantive provisions of Title VII as applied here are
not a proper exercise of congressional authority under [Section] 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 6 This carefully worded footnote signals a
much larger issue facing congressional enactments under Section 5. With
this language, the Court suggested that the Eleventh Amendment might

40. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
41. See id. at 452-53. The Court found that "Ithereis no dispute that in enacting the
1972 Amendments to Title VII to extend coverage to the States as employers, Congress
exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 453 n.9 (citing H.R.
REP. No. 92-238, at 19 (1971); S.REP. No. 92-415, at 10-11 (1971); National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
42. Id. at 456 (stating that "[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it
exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant,
it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose
other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority"); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.7, at 438 (stating that "[tihe Court reasoned that the
Fourteenth Amendment specifically was intended to limit state sovereignty, and therefore
congressional legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment can authorize suits directly
against the states in federal court"); Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation:Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer and Our Bifuracted Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1259, 1269 (2001) (arguing that
"the Court has never held or even implied that the Fourteenth Amendment abrogates
state immunity by itself, only that it authorizes Congress to do so and even then only when
Congress speaks clearly").
43. Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 456.
44. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (citing Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at
455).
45. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452 (finding the "threshold fact of congressional
authorization" for abrogating immunity under Title VII) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415
US.651,672 (1974)).
46. Id.at456n.11.
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be used to substantively challenge congressional enactments abrogating
state sovereign immunity."
While Fitzpatrick generally stands for the proposition that Congress,
acting pursuant to its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, can abrogate states' sovereign immunity, that power is not
without limitation. 48 Subsequent cases have held that Congress must be
explicit in its intent to override sovereign immunity.49 The explicit intent,
however, does not have to be found in the actual text of the statute; it can
be located in the legislative history and inferred from the general

structure of the statute.:

Later formulations of this standard have51

required Congress to make its abrogation intent "unmistakably clear.,
Fitzpatrickand its progeny, however, are limited to congressional power
exercised under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 2 These cases
intimated nothing about other possible sources of abrogation power,
such as the enumerated powers found in Article I.

47. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1113.
48. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (suggesting that Section 5 legislation is limited by
the constitutional grant of authority embodied within the prior sections of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
49. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
"does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the
immunity of the States; nor does it have a history which focuses directly on the question of
state liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States"). The decision in Quern was not
without its critics. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.7, at 439. Justices Brennan and
Marshall, concurring in the result and dissenting in part, argued that the facts in Quern
were not sufficient to reach the question of whether § 1983 abrogated the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. Therefore, the majority's discussion on that issue is dicta. Id.
50. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.7, at 438-40. See generally Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978) (holding that awards for attorney's fees are permissible as a form of
ancillary relief against states under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
51. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (holding that the
Rehabilitation Act of 1.973 did not authorize private suits against the states for monetary
damages).
52. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. In discussing the constitutional authority for
abrogating state sovereign immunity, the Court specifically refers only to Section 5 by
stating:
[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.... When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is
it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the
constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a
constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, in determining what
is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
Id. (internal citation omitted).

2003] The Eleventh Amendment in a States' Rights Era: Sword or Shield? 691

2. The Commerce Clause and Other Sources of CongressionalPower
a. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.: The Height of Congress's
Abrogation Power
In 1988, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the
of whether Congress's Commerce Clause power under Article
V gave it the authority to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity. 4 In

Iuestion

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,55 a heavily divided Court held that when
legislating pursuant to its plenary powers under Article I of the

Constitution, Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity." The
plurality's decision in Union Gas represented the height of Congress's
abrogation authority.57 However, the dispute between the Justices over
the basis for that authority drew more attention than the decision
reached by the Union Gas Court.58

53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).

55. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
56. See id. at 3-4. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, held that
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 19
(Brennan, J.); see also id. at 15 (ruling that "careful regard for precedent still would
mandate the conclusion that Congress has the power to abrogate immunity when
exercising its plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce"). Justice White did not
think that the statutes showed adequate intent to abrogate but provided a fifth vote for
Congress's ability to abrogate immunity under the powers enumerated in Article I. Id. at
45, 56-57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. See Ann Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, the More You Save: Can the
Spending Clause Save FederalAnti-Discrimination Laws?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1111, 1122
(2001) (pointing out that the plenary power granted to Congress by Union Gas was "shortlived"); see also Robert H. Freilich et al., Reagan's Legacy: A Conservative Majority Rules
on Civil Rights, Civil Liberties and State and Local Government Issues, 21 URB. LAw. 633,
672 (1989) (stating that, after Union Gas, "there is nothing more than political restraint
and a commitment to federalist principles to inhibit future congressional abrogation of
States' immunity").
58. See, e.g., James K. Floyd, Note, Piercing the Veil of Sovereign Immunity: Holding
States Liable in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 35 S.D. L. REv. 341, 349-50 (1990)
(suggesting that the abrogation power found by the Court is contained in the legislative
history, purpose, and policy of the statutes at issue); see also Donald L. Boren,
CongressionalPower To Grant Federal Courts Jurisdiction Over States: The Impact of
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 24 AKRON L. REv. 9, 17-19 (1990) (providing a detailed
analysis of the differences between Justice Brennan's plurality opinion and Justice Scalia's
dissent on whether Article I provides Congress with the power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Victoria L. Calkins, Note, State Sovereign Immunity After
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.: The Demise of the Eleventh Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 439, 441, 472-73 (1991) (arguing that Union Gas reduced the immunity of
the states to a privilege and suggesting that a stricter "state consent" standard would be
more true to principles of federalism).
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Justice Brennan, writing for a four-Justice plurality, 59 relied on two
very separate and distinct notions in determining that the Commerce
Clause authorizes abrogation of sovereign immunity.9 First, Justice
Brennan applied the Court's justification for abrogation under Section 5
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, concluding that "[l]ike the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Commerce Clause with one hand gives power to61
Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States.,
Thus, in ratifying the Constitution, the states consented to be sued
whenever Congress acts pursuant to its plenary powers. 62 The second
notion upon which Justice Brennan relied was that the Commerce Clause
is unique in its power to preempt the states, even when dormant. 6 If this
59. To understand how the votes were counted, it is helpful to note that there were
two holdings in Union Gas. The first holding, that Congress intended to permit private
suits under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia. See
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 3,13; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, § 7.7, at 441-42. The
second holding, that Congress has the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
through the Commerce Clause, had the votes of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens, and White. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 3-4, 19, 57; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 5, § 7.7, at 441-42. Justice White cast the crucial fifth vote on this second holding in
his concurring opinion, stating that "[o]n [the question of whether the Commerce Clause
grants Congress abrogation power], I concur in Justice Brennan's conclusion, but not his
reasoning." See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Justice White provided no reasoning as to why he only agreed
with the conclusion, prompting the following question: "Doesn't a Justice who casts the
deciding vote have some obligation to provide an explanation that is intelligible to the
legal community?" FALLON ET AL., supranote 7, at 1102.
60. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 20.
61. Id. at 16. Justice Brennan's reasoning on this point relied on the following
passage from Ex parte Virginia, quoted in Fitzpatrick:
Such enforcement [of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment] is
invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States
have, by the Constitution of the United States empowered Congress to enact....
[I]n excursing her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which the
Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach to that
extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the tight to exercise all its
granted powers, though they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she
would have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of
power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of the
governmental powers of the States. It is carved out of them.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1976) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346-48 (1880)).
62. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 1102.
63. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20. The Court stated:
The Commerce Clause, we have long held, displaces state authority even where
Congress has chosen not to act, and it sometimes precludes state regulation even
though existing federal law does not pre-empt it. Since the States may not
legislate at all in these last two situations, a conclusion that Congress may not
create a cause of action for money damages against the States would mean that
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second rationale were the basis of the Union Gas holding, Congress's
abrogation power would be limited to the Commerce Clause.6'
Justice Scalia, dissenting, relied on the Court's decision in Hans v.
Louisiana.65 He argued that the Hans Court upheld principles of
federalism found in the Eleventh Amendment, which provided for the
retention of sovereign immunity by the states. 66 In addition to attacking
the plurality's understanding of federalism and Hans, Justice Scalia
assaulted the plurality's reliance on Fitzpatrickand Congress's Section 5
abrogation powers. 67 Finally, Justice Scalia attempted to clarify the
proper distinction between Article I powers and Section 5 powers b
drawing Justice Brennan's first rationale to its logical conclusion.
According to Justice Scalia, "[a]n interpretation of the original
Constitution which permits Congress to eliminate sovereign immunity
only if it wants to renders the doctrine a practical nullity and is therefore
unreasonable."' 69 Therefore, the only power that can plausibly grant
Congress abrogation authority is the Fourteenth Amendment because it
was specifically "directed against the power of the States and permits
abrogation of their sovereign immunity only for a limited purpose."70 In
Justice Scalia's view, if sovereign immunity is to retain any constitutional
value, its abrogation must be restricted to those constitutional provisions
expressly directed at the states.71
b. Seminole Tribe v. Florida: Scaling Back Congress'sPower
Despite these deep disagreements, the essential holding in Union Gas
remained undisturbed until 1996, when the Supreme Court decided
no one could do so. And in many situations, it is only money damages that will
carry out Congress' legitimate objectives under the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 20 (internal citations omitted).
64. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 1102 (stating that Justice Brennan's first
rationale would permit Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity under any Article I
power, while the second rationale might not).
65. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

66. See id.
67. Id. at 41-42. According to Justice Scalia, the Fitzpatrick Court held:
[T]he Eleventh Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies . . . are necessarily limited by the later [Fourteenth] Amendment,
whose substantive provisions were by express terms directed at the States, and
were intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the States
and enlargements of the power of Congress.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

68. See id.
69. Id. at 42.
70. Id.

71. See id.
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Seminole Tribe v. Florida.72 This landmark holding overruled Union Gas

and limited Congress's abrogation power to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 73 Seminole Tribe presented a dispute over the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, enacted under Congress's Indian Commerce
Clause powers. 74 The Act required states to negotiate in good faith with

Indian tribes with respect to gaming activities. 5 The Act also authorized
tribes to bring enforcement suits in federal court. 76 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist divided his inquiry into two separate
questions: "first, whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent
to abrogate the immunity, and second, whether Congress has acted
pursuant to a valid exercise of power."'7 The Court answered the first
question affirmatively and without much analysis. 78 The second question,
however, was answered negatively, and a sharply divided Court
overturned Union Gas.79
72. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). In the period between Union Gas and Seminole Tribe, the
Court heard several Eleventh Amendment cases, but none were decided on the basis of
Union Gas; rather, all were struck down on other grounds. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth,
491 U.S. 293 (1989) (holding that states could not be sued under the Education of the
Handicapped Act because the statute did not expressly authorize the suits in federal
courts); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 98, 104 (1989)
(ruling by four justices that states could not be sued in federal court under the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code because the language did not meet the unmistakably clear
standard).
73. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
74. See id. at 47. The Indian Commerce Clause is U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
75. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(1)(C), 2710
(d)(3)(A)).
76. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)).
77. Id. at 55 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
7& See id. at 56-57 (stating that "[i]n sum, we think that the numerous references to
the 'State' in the text of § 2710(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended
through the Act to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit").
79. See id. at 72-73. The decision to overrule Union Gas produced an oft-occurring
division within the Court. In a five-to-four decision, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion, while Justices Souter, Breyer, Stevens, and
Ginsburg dissented. See id. at 46. Justices Souter and Stevens filed separate dissenting
opinions, which contained two very different, yet compelling arguments against the
Court's holding.
Justice Stevens's dissent focused primarily on the majority's use and interpretation of
both Hans v. Louisiana and Justice Iredell's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia. See id. at 78
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens first asserted that these cases involved the
interpretation of a congressional act, not the lack of constitutional power to abrogate state
immunity. Id. According to Justice Stevens, the dissent in Chisholm interpreted the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and not Article III of the Constitution; thus, there was no
constitutional basis for the lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 78-79.
Turning his attention next to Hans, Justice Stevens unleashed his most poignant
attack on the majority's position. See id. at 84. Justice Stevens argued that the majority
interpreted the holding in Hans too broadly. Id. Relying on his own concurring opinion in
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Union Gas, Stevens contended that Hans held that the federal courts should not hear suits
against non-consenting states as a matter of federal common law. Id. Therefore,
"[b]ecause Hans did not announce a constitutionally mandated jurisdictional bar, one
need not overrule Hans, or even question its reasoning, in order to conclude that Congress
may direct the federal courts to reject sovereign immunity in those suits not mentioned by
the Eleventh Amendment." Id. Justice Stevens, quoting extensively from the language in
Hans, concluded that the Hans Court characterized sovereign immunity as a
"presumption." See id. at 85-86. Thus, if immunity is merely a presumption, it can be
rebutted, and "Hans provides affirmative support for the view that Congress may create
federal-court jurisdiction over private causes of action against unconsenting States brought
by their own citizens." Id. at 86. Because Congress has the power to create such
jurisdiction, its action in the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act was a constitutional use of
congressional power. Id.
Finally, Justice Stevens distinguished Hans from Seminole Tribe on its facts. See id. at
86-87. In Hans, the dispute involved an implied right of action, while in Seminole Tribe,
Congress clearly stated its intention to provide the federal courts with the appropriate
jurisdiction. Id. at 87. For Justice Stevens, this distinction required that "the Court's
decision to apply the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in [Hans] clearly should
not control the outcome here." Id. Moreover, if the decision in Hans controlled in
situations of express jurisdictional grant, the entire body of "clear-statement" cases like
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon and Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance would be meaningless because Congress would have lacked the
constitutional power to enact such requirements in the first place, regardless of the
language Congress invoked. Id. at 90.
In contrast, Justice Souter's dissenting opinion offers a scholarly exposition of the
history of sovereign immunity that divides the issues into three distinct areas of inquiry:
first, whether States enjoyed sovereign immunity prior to the ratification of the
Constitution; second, what the precise entitlement to sovereign immunity was after the
ratification of the Constitution; and third, what abrogation power, if any, Congress
possesses. Id. at 101 (Souter, J., dissenting). In addressing the first question, Justice
Souter relied on English common law, as well as early colonial and constitutional writings.
Id. at 102-06. From his extensive review, Justice Souter concluded that common law
sovereign immunity had its roots in the thirteenth century, when "it was recognized that
the king could not be sued in his own courts." Id. at 103 (quoting C. JACOBS, ELEVENTH
Whether this notion was
AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 5 (1972)).
transferred into American law, however, is not, according to Justice Souter, entirely clear.
Id. Pointing to the 1787 drafting of the Constitution, Justice Souter noted that because of
the novel system of dual sovereignty, the drafters of the Constitution were presented with
numerous options. Id. at 104. They might have dealt with sovereign immunity by
completely eliminating immunity altogether; by recognizing a form of immunity, but
subjecting it to abrogation powers by Congress; or by including an inviolable provision in
the text of the Constitution guaranteeing the states common law immunity from suits in
federal court. Id. (citing Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 536-38 (1977)). Despite these
three possibilities, the Constitution is silent on the issue, and therefore, it is for the Court
to decide the proper place of sovereign immunity within the constitutional scheme. See id.
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Souter tackled the question of abrogation by evaluating
the majority's reliance on Chishlom and Hans. After an exhaustive review of these
decisions as well as the scholarly analysis written about them, Justice Souter contended
that the majority, in adopting Hans's rationale, compounded the three major errors of that
decision. Id. at 130. According to Justice Souter:
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After summarizing much of the Court's precedent from Fitzpatrick
through Union Gas, Chief Justice Rehnquist latched upon the
petitioner's analogy between the Indian Commerce Clause and the
Interstate Commerce Clause as a basis for reevaluating the Court's
decision to grant abrogation power under Article L"' The Court agreed
that the Indian Commerce Clause is indistinguishable from the Interstate
Commerce Clause and then discussed the continuing validity of Union
Gas.s' Ultimately, the Court concluded that "Union Gas was wrongly
decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled."' As a result of the
Court's opinion in Seminole Tribe, Congress's power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity resides exclusively in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and nowhere else."

[T]he Hans Court misread the Eleventh Amendment. It also misunderstood the
conditions under which common-law doctrines [of sovereign immunity] were
received or rejected at the time of the founding, and it fundamentally mistook
the very nature of sovereignty in the young Republic that was supposed to entail
a State's immunity to federal-question jurisdiction in a federal court.
Id. (internal citation omitted). Justice Souter reviewed in great detail the drafting of the
Constitution and the surrounding ratification debates for support for his proposition. See
generallyid. 131-69.
Finally, Justice Souter returned to the present for a discussion of Congress's
abrogation power. Id. at 170. Discussing first the inconsistencies between Seminole Tribe
and Ex parte Young, Justice Souter contended that the majority could have decided the
case on these grounds and thus rendered the constitutional holding unnecessary. Id. at
182. Absent a finding consistent with Young, Justice Souter concluded his dissent by
following the holding in Union Gas and upholding Congress's right to abrogate state
immunity under its Article I enumerated powers. Id. at 182-85.
80. See id. at 60. The Court stated:
[A]ccepting the lower court's conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to
Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause, petitioner now asks us to
consider whether that Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity.
Petitioner begins with the plurality decision in Union Gas and contends that
'[t]here is no principled basis for finding that congressional power under the
Indian Commerce Clause is less than that conferred by the Interstate Commerce
Clause.'
Id.(citing Brief for Petitioners).
81. See id. at 63.
82. Id. at 66.
83. See id. at 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article Ill, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed
upon federal jurisdiction."). Despite the Chief Justice's powerful declaration regarding
the use of Article I powers with respect to abrogation, the Circuit Courts have continued
to entertain and decide abrogation cases involving various Article I powers. See Paul E.
McGreal, Saving Article I From Seminole Tribe: A View from the Federalist Papers, 55
S.M.U. L. Rev. 393, 411 n. 93 (2002). Recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of whether the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause, Article I, section 8,
clause 4, provides Congress with the authority to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the
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D. The Limits on Congress'sAbility To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity
Under Section 5
1. The Congruenceand ProportionalityRequirement
After Seminole Tribe, one commentator described the burden on a
party seeking to sue a state in federal court as such: "the party asserting
abrogation must show that (1) Congress made a sufficiently clear
statement of its intent to abrogate, (2) Congress acted pursuant to its
Section 5 power, and (3) the exercise of Section 5 power was valid under
the circumstances." 4 City of Boerne v. Flores represents the Court's
states. See Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), No. 01-5769, slip op. (6th
Cir. 2003).
By addressing the issue of abrogation in bankruptcy proceedings, the Sixth Circuit
became the sixth Circuit Court to address the issue, and the first to rule that the
Bankruptcy Clause provides Congress with abrogation power. Compare Hood v. Tenn.
Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), No. 01-5769, slip op. (6th Cir. 2003), with Nelson v.
La Crosse County Dist. Attorney (In re Nelson), 301 F.3d 820, 832 (7th Cir. 2002);
Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000); Sacred
Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133
F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998); Fernandez v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. LLC (In re Fernandez),
123 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997);
Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C.), 119 F.3d 1140,
1145-46 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075 (1998). As its basis for decision, the
Sixth Circuit relied on the framework established in Seminole Tribe and Alden v. Maine,
the text of the Constitution, and the Federalist Papers. See Hood v. Tenn. Student
Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), No. 01-5769, slip op. at 9-19 (6th Cir. 2003). Relying
specifically on the Supreme Court's opinion in Alden v. Maine, the Sixth Circuit argued
that "when determining whether Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity, courts
are to look at the original structure of the Constitution." See id. at 9 (citing Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)). Turning to the text of the Constitution, the court
latched onto the word "uniform" contained in the Bankruptcy Clause, arguing that
"[g]ranting the federal government the power to make uniform laws is, at least to some
extent, inconsistent with states retaining the power to make laws over that issue." See id.
at 10. Finally, as a means of providing additional support for its contention, the court
referred to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No.'s 32 and 81, both written by Alexander
Hamilton. See id. at 15. The court argued that in THE FEDERALIST No. 81 Hamilton
suggested that there were specific circumstances where the states surrendered their
sovereign immunity and that those circumstances were discussed previously in the "article
of taxation." See id. at 15 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 422). According to the
majority, the article on taxation to which Hamilton referred was THE FEDERALIST No. 32,
where Hamilton stated that "the state government would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated
to the United States." Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 155). According to the
majority, the word "uniform" in the Bankruptcy Clause indicates the delegation of
exclusive authority to the United States and, therefore, "the Constitution's text and
Hamilton's reference in THE FEDERALIST No. 81 ...suggest that, with the Bankruptcy
Clause, the states granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity." Id.
at 18.
84. Roger C. Hartley, The New Federalism and the ADA: State Sovereign Immunity
From Private Damage Suits After Boerne, 24 N.Y.U. REV. LAW & Soc. CHANGE 481,488
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articulation of the standards for determining whether Congress's6 use of
its Section 5 power is valid and whether the third step is satisfied.
In City of Boerne, the Court was presented with the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which limited governments' ability
to pass laws that "substantially burden[ed] a person's exercise of

religion." ' In determining whether this statute was a legitimate use of
Congress's Section 5 power, the Court first had to define the extent of
that power. In doing so, the Court developed a broad formulation that

included the power to enact both preventive and remedial legislation.""

The Court, however, was also determined to set boundaries on this broad
grant of power by holding that "[t]he design of the Amendment and the
text of [Section] 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has
the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the States."
Once the scope of the power was defined, the Court turned its
attention to the standard of review that was to be applied in Section 5
(1998). Professor Hartley points out that there was some dispute among lower courts as to
the second step of his three-part test. Id. at n. 40; Compare Coger v. Bd. of Regents, 154
F.3d 296, 303 (6th Cir. 1998) vacated by 528 U.S. 1110 (2000) (holding specific intent to
legislate under Section 5 is irrelevant if Congress actually possesses the legislative
authority), and Scott v. Univ. of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that
Congress does not have to recite the power under which it enacts legislation), with Driesse
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (maintaining that for
Congress to use its Section 5 power it should indicate that the statute is combating the
violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights). Subsequent formulations by the Supreme
Court, however, have solidified Professor Hartley's interpretation of the analytical steps
required to determine the validity of Section 5 legislation. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (stating that "Congress's Section 5 power is not confined
to the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment").
85. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
86. See id. at 536 (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was
not a valid use of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a), (b) (2000). The RFRA specifically prohibited laws that
"substantially burden[ed] a person's exercise of religion" unless they advanced a
"compelling governmental interest" and were the "least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest." Id.
8& See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
89. See id. at 524 (finding that Congress's power under Section 5 is both "remedial
and preventive"). The Court also provided for the possibility that "[l]egislation which
deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to
the States."' See id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
90. See id. at 519. This statement seems to be a warning shot across the bow of
Congress, politely yet forcefully reminding Congress of its place with respect to
constitutional interpretation. The opinion has been described by a commentator as an
effort "to put down what it saw as a congressional rebellion." Stephen Gardbaum, The
Federalism Implications of Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665,669 (1998).
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The Court introduced what has become known as the
cases.
"congruence and proportionality" test.9' This test requires Congress to
demonstrate "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such
a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect."' 2 While City of Boerne itself did not overrule any legislation
other than certain provisions in the RFRA, it set the stage for additional
challenges resulting in further restrictions on Congress's Section 5 power
to abrogate sovereign immunity. 93
2. The Application of City of Boerne to FederalLaw Abrogating
Sovereign Immunity
The Court's first opportunity to apply the principles of City of Boerne
to a congressional attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity
occurred in Florida PrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank.9' There, the Court held that the provisions in the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 95 which
allowed patent holders to sue infringing states, constituted an
The Court considered
unconstitutional use of congressional power.
whether any of the three separate and independent grants of power

91. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
92. Id. In attempting to add some meaning to this language, one commentator noted
that the test "permits the Court to probe more deeply the telic relationship between the
legislation that regulates constitutional conduct by the states and the Fourteenth
Amendment violations to be prevented or remedied." Hartley, supra note 84, at 495.
Professor Hartley added that the test is "more demanding than the rational basis test." Id.
Further commentary has stated that the test "reset the federal-state balance" and
"confirmed in unambiguous terms just how serious it is about protecting federalism."
Gardbaum, supra note 90, at 666.
93. At the time Boerne was decided, multiple observers foresaw the importance of
the decision. According to Douglas Laycock, the attorney for Archbishop Flores, "if
Boerne] mean[s] what it says, [than Boerne] is by far the most important of the recent
round of federalism decisions. Several statutes that were previously uncontroversial are
subject to serious constitutional attack .... Nothing is overruled, but everything is
changed." Hartley, supra note 84, at 495 n.83 (quoting Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulf
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 744 (1998)); see also Marci A.
Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores: A Landmarkfor StructuralAnalysis, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 699, 722 (1998) (stating that Boerne "is a strong message to Congress to act with
responsibility, accountability, and independent judgment").
94. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
95. Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (adding sections 271(h) and 296 to Title
35, United States Code).
96. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-36, 647 (holding that none of the three
justifications used by Congress - the Patent and Copyright Clause, the Interstate
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment - could be used to
abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states in this case).
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would permit Congress to enact the statute.' The Court dismissed the
first two potential sources of authority - the Commerce Clause and the
Patent Clause - by stating that "Seminole Tribe makes clear that
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its
Article I powers."9 8 In assessing the statute under Congress's Section 5
power, the Court focused on the legislative record, as it had in City of
Boerne.9 According to the majority, Congress failed to show patterns of
state patent infringement, "let alone a patern of constitutional
violations."'t'
Relying on procedural due process precedent regarding
patents, 1 ' the majority concluded that "Congress ... barely considered
the availability of state remedies for patent infringement and hence
whether the States' conduct might have amounted to a constitutional

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Therefore, according to the
majority, the Patent Remedy Act failed the test articulated in City
' °3 of
Boerne, as "there was no constitutional problem that needed fixing.
97. Id. at 635-36.
98. Id. at 636.
99. See id. at 640-41.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 642-43. Interestingly for a Section 5 case, the Court focused on notions
of procedural, rather than substantive, due process. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that
"[i]n procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally
protected interest ... is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the
deprivation of such an interest without due process of law." Id. at 643 (quoting Zinerman
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). Thus, the Court could focus on the available state
remedies for patent infringement rather than the violation of a substantive right. See id. at

642-43.
102. Id. at 643.
103. Gottesman, supra note 14, at 64. Justice Stevens' dissent first accused the
majority of "strik[ing] down Congress' Act based on an absence of findings supporting a
requirement this Court had not yet articulated." Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 654
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens continued:
This Court has never mandated that Congress must find widespread and
persisting deprivation of constitutional rights in order to employ its § 5 authority.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress did not compile an extensive
legislative record analyzing the due process (or lack thereof) that each State
might afford for a patent infringement suit retooled as an action in tort. In 1992,
Congress had no reason to believe it needed to do such a thing; indeed, it should
not have to do so today.
Id. at 660 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In addition, Justice Stevens
accused the Court of misreading the holding in City of Boerne by stating that "[t]he
Court's opinion today threatens to read Congress' power to pass prophylactic legislation
out of § 5 altogether; its holding is unsupported by City of Boerne and in fact conflicts with
our reasoning in that case." Id. Finally, Justice Stevens launched a full assault on the
majority's recent application of the Eleventh Amendment, referencing Seminole Tribe and
stating:
The full reach of that case's dramatic expansion of the judge-made doctrine of
sovereign immunity is unpredictable; its dimensions are defined only by the
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The following term, the Supreme Court reviewed another
congressional statute abrogating state sovereign immunity and enacted
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'O' This time, the private
suits were brought against the state of Florida under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).1°5 The majority
applied the congruence and proportionality test and concluded that
Congress did not have the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to provide for abrogation of sovereign immunity in the
ADEA.' 6
° is significant because of the way in
Kimel v. FloridaBoard of RegentsW

which Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, applied the congruence
and proportionality test to the ADEA.'" Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion first demonstrated that the legality of age discrimination by

states is determined by an exercise of rational basis review. °9 In light of
this highly deferential standard, Justice O'Connor concluded that "the
ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional."'" 0
Therefore, the ADEA failed the "congruence" portion of the test."'
The Court, however, did not consider this failure alone to be fatal. " 2
In addition, Justice O'Connor, just as the Court had in City of Boerne
and Florida Prepaid, carefully scrutinized the legislative history and
found that "Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and
present majority's perception of constitutional penumbras rather than
constitutional text. Until this expansive and judicially created protection of
States' rights runs its course, I shall continue to register my agreement with the
views expressed in the Seminole dissents and in the scholarly commentary on that
case.
Id. at 665 (citation omitted).
104. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
105. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000). The ADEA prohibits employers, including states, "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's age." Id. § 623(a)(1).
106. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83 ("[Tlhe ADEA is not 'appropriate legislation' under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
107. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
10& See generallyid. at 83-91.
109. Id. at 83-84. The Court contrasts this situation with one in which the state
discriminates on the basis of race or gender, stating that those circumstances "require a
tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve." Id. at 84.
For further discussion on this issue, see Gottesman, supra note 14, at 65.
110. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.

111. See Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing FederalCivil Rights Against Public Entities After
Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41, 49 (2001). Professor Hartley uses the term "overbreadth,"
defined as "creat[ing] rights that exceed those provided in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment," to describe the scope of a federal statute that will fail the congruence
portion of the congruence and proportionality test. See id.
112. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.
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local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their
employees on the basis of age. 113 Therefore, not only was the ADEA
incongruent, but it was disproportionate as well. The ADEA thus failed
both portions of the City of Boerne test. "4
3. The ADA: The Most Recent Statute To Fail
The most recent challenge to Congress's Section 5 power came in
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett."5 In Garrett,
the Supreme Court analyzed Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA), 116 which prohibits employers, including states, from
discriminating against individuals in the workplace because of a
disability."7 The ADA also provided federal court jurisdiction over suits
against states for violations of its provisions. "8 The question in Garrett
was whether "Congress acted within its constitutional authority by
subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money damages under
the ADA. '119
In reversing the Eleventh Circuit and finding this provision of the
ADA unconstitutional,2 the majority opinion divided its analysis into
three parts. First, the majority set out to "identify with some precision
the scope of the constitutional right at issue.' 2' Applying the decision in
Kimel, the Court examined precedent regarding challenges of disability
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 22 Relying
heavily on the rationale of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,

113. Id. at 91.
114. See id. ("In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive
requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age
discrimination by the States, we hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress'
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
115. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (2000); see also Garrett,531 U.S. at 360.
117. The relevant portion of the ADA forbids employers from "discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
118. Id. § 12202 ("A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.").
119. Garrett,531 U.S. at 364.
120. Id. at 374.
121. Id. at 365.
122 Id.
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Inc.,' 23 the Court held that "[i]f special accommodations for the disabled
are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through

the Equal Protection Clause."' 2 4
Once the boundaries of the constitutional right were established, the
Court moved to its second analytical step, considering Congress's
attempt to demonstrate a "history and pattern" of discrimination by state

governments with respect to the disabled.1 2' Here, the majority carefully
scrutinized the legislative record compiled by Congress and concluded
that the record fell "far short of even suggesting the pattern of
discrimination on which [Section] 5 legislation must be
unconstitutional
, 126
based.

123. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that mental retardation did not qualify as a quasisuspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause and thus the legislation was
subject only to a rational basis standard of judicial review).
124. Garrett,531 U.S. at 368. On the subject of positive law, the majority noted that at
"the time that Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted
such measures.... A number of these provisions, however, did not go as far as the ADA
did in requiring accommodation." Id. at 386 n.5.
125. Id. at 368 (asking "whether Congress identified a history and pattern of
unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled").
126. Id. at 370 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000)). The
majority in Garrettcited the evidence Congress provided, which included the following:
A department head at the University of North Carolina refused to hire an
applicant for the position of health administrator because he was blind; similarly,
a student at a state university in South Dakota was denied an opportunity to
practice teach because the dean at that time was convinced that blind people
could not teach in public schools. A microfilmer at the Kansas Department of
Transportation was fired because he had epilepsy; deaf workers at the University
of Oklahoma were paid a lower salary than those who could hear. The Indiana
State Personnel Office informed a woman with a concealed disability that she
should not disclose it if she wished to obtain employment.
Id. at 369.
The dissent by Justice Breyer took exception to the Court's conclusion with respect
to the validity of the evidence supplied by Congress. See id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Accusing the majority of "[r]eviewing the congressional record as if it were an
administrative agency record," Justice Breyer contended that the majority's "failure to
find sufficient evidentiary support may well rest upon its decision to hold Congress to a
strict, judicially created evidentiary standard, particularly in respect to lack of
justification." Id. at 376, 382. This standard, according to Justice Breyer and other
constitutional commentators, appears to shift the burden from the individual challenging
economic and social legislation to Congress. See id. at 383; see also A. Christopher Bryant
& Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the
Record" Constitutional Review of FederalStatutes, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 328, 339 (2001)
(showing origins of record review in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). In other
words, prior to Lopez, Kimel, Garrett, and other federalism decisions, the presumption
was that legislation passed by Congress was valid until sufficiently rebutted by challengers.
See Bryant & Simeone, supra, at 341-42. Now, the presumption, without specific language
to this effect by the Court, seems to be that legislation is invalid and that Congress bears
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Finally, the majority applied the "congruence and proportionality" test
established in City of Boerne."7 Without offering a very detailed
analysis, the majority concluded that the requirements were not met by
the ADA. 1'2 The ADA's "application to the States would allow Congress
to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in
Cleburne. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional
authority."1' 29
At the time of Garrett, the ADA was the Section 5 legislation most
likely to survive judicial review."3 The latest battle over Congress's
Section 5 power is being fought over the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (FMLA), 3' which also provides for private suits for money
damages against the states in federal court. 32 As explained inthe next
part of this Comment, the circuits are currently split on the propriety of

the burden of justifying its actions with respect to economic and social legislation. See id.
at 340.
The Garrett dissent also called into question the standard of review used by the
majority in reviewing congressional enactments pursuant to Section 5. See Garrett, 531
U.S. at 387. Justice Breyer stated: "[I]t is difficult to understand why the Court, which
applies 'minimum "rational-basis" review' to statutes that burden persons with disabilities,
subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help those same individuals." Id. at
387-88 (internal citation omitted).
127. Garrett,531 U.S at 372.
128. See id. at 372-73.
The majority's analysis focused on the "reasonable
accommodation" requirement provisions of the ADA, stating that the "accommodation
duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of
alternative responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an 'undue
burden' upon the employer." Id. at 373. The Court proceeded to compare the ADA to
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, finding a "stark" contrast between the evidence of
constitutional violations presented in that legislative record and the evidence supplied in
the ADA's legislative record. See id. at 373-74. This direct comparison to a nonanalogous statutory scheme may signal reluctance by the current Supreme Court to extend
Congress's Section 5 powers beyond the limited area of voting rights.
129. Id. at 374 (footnote omitted). The Court pointed out the limits of its holding in a
footnote and stated:
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does
not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against
discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the
States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for
money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief
under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In addition, state laws protecting the
rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide
independent avenues of redress.
Id. at 374 n.9.
130. See Gottesman, supranote 14, at 32. See generallyid. at 76-96.
131. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000)).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (a)(2) (2000).
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Congress's use of Section 5 in the FMLA. The Court's resolution of the
issue could yet again dramatically alter the law of sovereign immunity.
II. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: GENDER DISCRIMINATION
AND ELEVENTH AMENDMENT ABROGATION

Taken together, City of Boerne, ' Kimel,1 4 and Garrett'35 provide the
states with a fully brandished, incredibly sharp sword that has been, and
can continue to be, used to attack congressional legislation from
imposing private suits for money damages against the states.' 36 The latest
battleground involving Section 5 power concerns the abrogation
provisions in the FMLA.'37 Two cases, one from the Fifth Circuit r3 and
one from the Ninth Circuit,'3 9 specifically address this issue. In each case,
the Circuit Court applied the Supreme Court precedent but reached
contradictory conclusions regarding the validity of Congress's use of its
Section 5 powers to enact the FMLA.' 40
A. The Family and Medical Leave Act: Fighting UnconstitutionalGender
Discrimination
The FMLA represents a direct attempt by Congress to combat
unconstitutional gender discrimination. 4 ' At the time of FMLA's
133. See supraPart I.D.1.
134. See supra Part I.D.2.
135. See supra Part I.D.3.
136. See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 396 (2001);
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1995); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Article I does not give
Congress the power to subject non-consenting states to private suits for money damages in
state courts).
137. Compare Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted sub nom. Nev. Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mem.)
(holding that Congress, in enacting the FMLA, properly abrogated Nevada's sovereign
immunity under Section 5), with Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding the FMLA's abrogation language invalid as an exercise of Congress's Section 5
power); Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); Townsel v. Missouri,
233 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d
233 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000) (same);
Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2000) (same).
138. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526, 529 (holding that two subsections of the FMLA do not
validly abrogate the state of Louisiana's sovereign immunity).
139. Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 873 (holding that the FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress's
Section 5 powers).
140. Compare Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 533, with Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 873.
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2000). The FMLA's statement of purpose contains
express language that the intent of the law is to "minimize[] the potential for employment
discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for ...
compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis." Id.
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enactment, Congress recognized that the "absence of adequate policies
allowing for extended family leave inhibited women's roles in the
workplace."' 42 The legislative history of the FMLA contains abundant
findings, both in the form of testimony and floor statements, reflecting
this clear intent. 143
The FMLA was not strictly limited to women's issues such as
maternity leave.'" In fact, the legislation was designed to encourage
fathers to take a more active, participatory role in all aspects of family
life, "thereby relieving family burdens from women and reducing
stereotypical assumptions that only women are able to care for sick and
young family members."'45 The statute is gender-neutral, requiring that
twelve weeks of leave be granted to both men and women. 46
In addition, Congress documented studies that substantiated the
existence of gender discrimination in the leave programs and policies
afforded to state employees.' 47 A close examination of the legislative
142. Stephanie C. Bovee, Note, The Family Medical Leave Act: State Sovereignty and
the Narrowing of Fourteenth Amendment Protection, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
1011, 1019 (2001) (citing Martin Malin, Fathers and ParentalLeave, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1047,
1047 (1994)).
143. See, e.g., Parentaland Medical Leave Act of 1987: HearingsBefore the Subcom. on
Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm on Labor and Human
Resources on S. 249, Part2, 100th Cong. 536 (1988) (statement of Prof. Susan Deller Ross,
Georgetown University Law Center) ("[Tihere are a number of studies ... in which it's
shown that employers in this country that are giving family leaves to their workers are not
giving it non-discriminatorily; they are, by and large, giving it only to women, not to men.
It's fairly flagrant discrimination."); see also Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate
Comm on Labor and Human Resources on S. 5, 102d Cong. 10 (1991) (statement of Sen.
Brock Adams, Member, Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources) ("[T]he reality
today is that women are the primary caregivers for elderly parents .... It is the daughters,
whether biological or through marriage, that account for the majority of caregivers.").
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (b) (2000).
145. Bovee, supra note 142, at 1019 (citing Robin R. Cockey & Deborah A. Jeon, The
Family Medical Leave Act at Work: Getting Employers To Value Families, 4 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 225,228 (1996)).
146. See id. at 1019-20. Evidence shows that 41.8% of leave-takers are men, as
compared to 48.2% for women. See id. at 1019 n. 67 (citing COMM'N OF FAMILY AND
MED. LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY MEDICAL

LEAVE POLICIES 149 (1996)). The reason for the slight discrepancy is "partly because
men do not bear children" and also "partly because women are somewhat more likely to
care for infants or seriously ill family members than are men." Id. (quoting A WORKABLE
BALANCE, supra, at 149-50).
147. The Parentaland Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House
Comm on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong. 30 (1986) (statement of Meryl Frank, Director,
Yale Bush Center Infant Care Leave Project) ("We found that public sector leaves don't
vary very much from private sector leaves."). Frank's results were from an extensive
survey of private and public employers. See id. at 29-30. The legislative history includes
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history reveals that Congress heard numerous pieces of testimony
substantiating that the expectation of women's continued responsibilities
in the domestic realm was directly affecting their ability to succeed in the
workplace. 1 8 Also, the legislative history addressed the issue of state
employees and family leave, finding that while many states had laws
protecting private sector employees, few, if any, had laws providing state
employees with medical leave. 49 With legislative history relating to
gender discrimination as the foundation, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals were forced to apply the Supreme Court precedent
holding gender discrimination to a "heightened" scrutiny"5 to the more
recent and narrow Section 5 holdings of City of Boerne, Kimel, and
Garrett.
B. The Fifth Circuit'sApproach to the FMLA and Section 5: Neither
Congruent nor Proportional

In 2000, the Fifth Circuit was presented with Kazmier v. Widmann,51 a
challenge to the FMLA by the state of Louisiana. 52 Janice Kazmier, an
statistics on private sector leave from a 1990 study of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See
S. REP. No. 103-3, at 14-15, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 17. ("37 percent of full-time
employees working in private business with more than 100 workers are covered by unpaid
'maternity leave'; 18 percent are covered by unpaid 'paternity leave.').
148. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Joint Hearings Before the
Subcomm on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standardsof the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 100th Cong. 235 (1987) (statement of Donna
Lenhoff, Associate Director, Women's Legal Defense Fund). Ms. Lenhoff stated:
[O]ur social structures, and most particularly our employment policies, continue
to operate as if women's role is to stay home and care for the family and men's
role is to work outside the home for a paycheck.
[W]e have not accommodated our institutions to the simple reality that men and
women no longer operate in separate spheres, but rather that all employees,
male and female, have family as well as employment responsibilities. Such
accommodation is necessary if workers, and especially women workers, are to be
able to exercise their right to equal employment and at the same time to preserve
their family lives.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-8(l), at 16-17 (1993) ("The typical worker is no longer a
man supporting a wife who stays at home, with the woman caring for the children and
tending to other family needs .... Yet our workplaces are still too often modeled on the
unrealistic and outmoded idea of workers unencumbered by family responsibilities."); S.
REP. No. 102-68, at 28 (1991) ("In the absence of a family leave standard, childbirth and
the need to care for a sick child or parent have an adverse impact on women's earnings.").
149. See H.R. REP. No. 103-8(l), at 77-83 (attachment 13). Congress stated: "The
debate on family and medical leave suggests that many States have already passed such
leave benefits as are contained in [FMLA]. Yet, that is not the case .... No State has
chosen to pass State legislation that is as broad in scope and coverage as that pending in
Congress." Id. at 78.
150. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
151. 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000).
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employee of the Louisiana Department of Social Services (LDSS), was

terminated from her job in early 1996 for failure to report to work.' Ms.
Kazimer responded by filing a lawsuit in federal district court, claiming
that her termination violated the FMLA.'- 4 LDSS filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant
to the Eleventh Amendment; the district court denied
55

the motion.
The Fifth Circuit applied the test articulated in Kimel as the "clearest
guidance for determining whether legislation that purports to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause against the States is
'congruent and proportional.", 5 6 Having established the legal precedent
for its analysis, the Fifth Circuit proceeded to address subsections C and
D of the FMLA separately,'57 thereby acknowledging the possibility of

severability.""
152. Id. at 522.
153. Id. at 522-23. Ms. Kazmier took leave intermittently throughout 1995 for various
reasons. Id. Initially, in May 1995, she took leave to care for a broken arm suffered while
bicycling. Id. In addition, she took leave in October 1995 to care for her elderly father.
Id. Finally, according to the court, she took leave again to care for a broken wrist. Id.
154. Id. at 523. Specifically, Ms. Kazimer claimed that the termination was in violation
of § 2612(a)(1)(C) and § 2612(a)(1)(D). Id. at 525. These provisions require employers to
grant leave to an eligible employee "[ijn order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter,
or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition" or [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
perform the functions of the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(C),(D).
155. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 523.
156. Id. at 524. The Fifth Circuit described the two-part Kimel test by stating:
At the first step, we begin our analysis by determining what type of constitutional
violation the statute under review is designed to prevent. The outermost limits of
Congress's potential authority to enact prophylactic legislation is directly linked
to the level of scrutiny that we apply in assessing the validity of discriminatory
classifications of the targeted type.... [W]e examine, at Kimel's second step, the
legislative record of the statute under review to see whether it contains evidence
of actual constitutionalviolations by the States sufficient to justify the full scope of
the statute's provisions.
Id. at 524.
157. See id. at 525.
15& Id. The court claimed that it "discover[ed] no reason why the provisions of one of
the FMLA's subsections could not validly abrogate... immunity even if the provisions of
some or all of the remaining subsections fail to do so. Id. Severablilty, however, is far
from a settled issue and the FMLA might not be severable in the way that the Fifth Circuit
intended.
A statute is severable "if after an invalid portion of it has been stricken out, that
which remains is self-sustaining and capable of separate enforcement without regard to the
stricken portion, in which case that which remains should be sustained." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1374 (6th ed. 1990). Whether the FMLA is a "severable statute" is a
question of statutory construction. The test for severability was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in 1932. John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 204
(1993) (citing Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). The
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Subsection C, according to the majority, was enacted by Congress in
response to evidence of private sector gender discrimination against men
when it came to granting family leave. 5 9 Because of the heightened
scrutiny afforded to discrimination based on sex, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that "Congress potentially has wide latitude under Section
5 to enact broad prophylactic legislation designed to prevent the States
from discriminating on the basis of sex."1
This broad discretion,
however, was not broad enough for the FMLA to survive the Kimel
test. 6' According to the Fifth Circuit, Congress had failed to identify a
pattern of discrimination in the public sector, and the court was not
willing to "infer from private sector conduct that the States are willfully
violating their constitutional duty to refrain from engaging in sex
Champlin test for severability depends on two factors: "(1) legislative intent, and (2) the
ability of the statute to function without the offending provision." Id. at 215; see also
Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234 ("Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not,
the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.").
Despite the test, severablility seems dependent on the presence or absence of a
"severability clause." See Nagle, supra, at 222. The presence of such a clause creates a
presumption of severability but is not dispositive of the issue. Id. Courts analyzing
legislative intent can easily overcome this presumption; the Supreme Court found three
statutes non-severable despite the existence of a severability clause. Id. at 223-24 (citing
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 241-44 (1928); Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935), overruled by Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1 (1976); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-16 (1936)). One
commentator captured the confusion beautifully in a seminal article on severability when
he wrote: "Separability clause[s] are thus now significant only because of their absence.
Like articles of clothing, if they are present little attention is paid to them, but if they are
absent they may be missed." Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the
Supreme Court,51 HARV. L. REv. 76, 122 (1937).
The problem with the Fifth Circuit's treatment of the severability of the FMLA is its
lack of analysis. See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525. Instead, severability is presumed. Yet,
after two portions of the statute are found unconstitutional, the statute is significantly
different. See id. at 525-29. This presumption of severability may be a violation of
separation of powers as it results in a "new" statute that "has not been enacted in
conformity with the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements." Nagle,
supra, at 228 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any
Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21-23 (1984)); see also Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S 417, 442-49 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act violated the
Presentment Clause by departing from "finely wrought" constitutional procedure for
enactment of law). If legislative intent is the determinative factor for severability, the
FMLA would appear to be non-severable, as the Fifth Circuit was unable to point to any
statutory language or legislative history that justifies its presumption of severablity. See
Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525. Thus, whether the construction of the statute adopted by the
Fifth Circuit is permissible under the severablility analysis remains an open question for
the Supreme Court in evaluating the constitutionality of the FMLA.
159. Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525.
160. Id. at 526.
161. See id.
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discrimination."1 62 Thus, because the legislation was prophylactic in
nature, for the law to be congruent and proportional, Congress had to
have made detailed findings of unconstitutional behavior by the states. 163
If the legislation had been remedial, there would be no strict evidentiary
requirement.'6
The Fifth Circuit dealt an even stronger blow to subsection D of the
FMLA. 165 In addition to holding it unconstitutional under the test
established in Kimel, the court found that "[t]he legislative record
contains the additional suggestion that Congress meant for this provision
to prevent discrimination against women on the basis of pregnancyrelated disability."' 66 Relying on the 1974 Supreme Court decision,
Geduldig v. Aiello,'67 the court held that "to the extent that subsection D
targets such discrimination, it does not fall within Congress's1
enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
By defining the purpose of the legislation entirely outside the bounds of
the Fourteenth Amendment,'69 the court was able to hold that the FMLA
was analogous to the ADEA and the ADA, both of which attempted to
prevent discrimination based
on conditions outside the bounds of the
7
Fourteenth Amendment.' 1
The approach taken by the Fifth Circuit can be generally characterized
as a strict interpretation of Kimel. The Fifth Circuit has held that where
a federal statute lacks evidence of unconstitutional discrimination by the
states, abrogation of the sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh
Amendment is not within Congress's Section 5 powers and is therefore
unconstitutional. 7'

162 Id. at 526 n.28; see also id. at 526 ("Finally, the United States' argument that
Congress found substantial age discrimination in the private sector ...is beside the point.
Congress made no such findings with respect to the States.") (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000)).
163. See id. at 526.
164. Id. ("If subsection (C) were solely remedial in nature the absence of evidence of
constitutional violations might not present a problem.").
165. See id. at 527-29.
166. Id. at 527.
167. Id. (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding denial of benefits for
work loss resulting from normal pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause)).
168. Id. at 528.
169. Id. The Court determined that, because the legislation aimed to prevent
discrimination based on pregnancy, it was designed to prevent discrimination based on a
"temporary disability." Id.
170. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text; notes 120-29 and accompanying
text.
171. See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 529.
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C. The Ninth Circuit'sApproach to the FMLA: Dulling the Blade of

Kimel
In sharp contrast to the Fifth Circuit's holding in Kazmier is the Ninth
Circuit holding in Hibbs v. Departmentof Human Resources.'7' In Hibbs,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the FMLA's abrogation of states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity is valid under Section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment.1 73
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis utilizing the framework provided

by the Supreme Court in Kimel.' 74 The court noted that the FMiLA was

designed to combat gender discrimination, which is a type of preferential
treatment that receives heightened constitutional scrutiny.

The

existence of a heightened standard of constitutional review for gender
discrimination creates a presumption that discrimination on the basis of
gender is unconstitutional. 7 6 Unlike age and disability discrimination,
the subjects of Kimel and Garrett,77 in gender discrimination cases,

according to the Ninth Circuit, the state has the burden of defending its
discriminatory practices; the individual does not have the burden of
7
proving otherwise."

Due to the heightened scrutiny afforded gender discrimination, the

Ninth Circuit was confronted with the problem of how to deal with the
substantial "overbreadth"

contained in the FMILA.

79

The court

172. 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Nev. Dep't of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mem.).
173. Id at 873.
174. Id. at 853. The court held:
The congruence and proportionality inquiry requires a reviewing court (1) "to
identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue,"
Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 963, and (2) to determine whether the statute in question is
"an appropriate remedy" for violations of that right, perhaps by scrutinizing the
statute's legislative history. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.
Id.
175. Id. at 854 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). Because
gender discrimination is subject to heightened scrutiny, "[s]uch discrimination is thus
unconstitutional unless it is substantially related to the achievement of an important
governmental interest." Id. at 855 (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
150 (1980)) (stating "precedents require that gender-based discriminations must serve
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives"). In addition, the Court
pointed to the fact that, under heightened scrutiny, "the burden is on the defender of such
discrimination to prove that the standard has been met." Id.
176. Id. (stating that heightened scrutiny "has the effect of creating a rebuttable
presumption of unconstitutionality for state-sponsored gender discrimination").
177. See id. at 855-56 (citing the allocation of burdens used by the Supreme Court in
Kimel and Garrett).
178. Id. at 855.
179. See id. at 856.
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concluded that the mere fact that the FMLA encompasses more behavior
than is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment is not sufficient to find
its enactment an invalid use of Congress's Section 5 powers.18
Therefore, the court was left with the question of whether the FMLA is
"'just such an appropriate remedy or, instead, merely an attempt to
substantively redefine States' legal obligations' under the Fourteenth
Amendment."'' 1 Phrasing the question in this manner presented a
conflict between the Supreme Court's holdings in Garrett and Kimel with

respect to the appropriate role of legislative history."" In addressing this
conflict, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Kimel approach, holding that

"[e]xamination of legislative history is merely one means by which a
court can determine whether the broad prophylactic legislation under
consideration is justified
83 by the existence of sufficiently difficult and
intractable problems.'
This approach, combined with the heightened scrutiny afforded gender
discrimination, allowed the court to make a further distinction between
this case and Garrett.'84 According to the court, the failure to find

evidence of unconstitutional behavior within the legislative history
subjected the statutes in Kimel and Garrett to a "presumption of
The existence of this presumption placed the6
unconstitutionality.""'

burden on Congress to prove the constitutionality of its enactments.18

As the court pointed out, this presumption has a "flip side"; if the

rational basis test produces a presumption of unconstitutionality,
heightened scrutiny must create a presumption of constitutionality.
180. See id. at 856 (stating that .'[d]ifficult and intractable problems often require
powerful remedies,' which may include 'reasonably prophylactic legislation' (quoting
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)).
181. Id.
182. See id. The court pointed out that Garrett"could be taken to imply that adequate
support in the legislative record is always a requirement for a valid exercise of Congress'
section 5 power." Id. According to the court, this position is in direct conflict with both
Kimel and FloridaPrepaidBank, which hold that lack of evidence in the legislative history
is not determinative of a violation of Section 5. Id.; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999) (stating that "the
lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative").
183. Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 857; see also Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d
77, 81 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 531. U.S. 356 (2001) ("The ultimate
question remains not whether Congress created a sufficient legislative record, but rather
whether, given all of the information before the Court, it appears that the statute in
question can appropriately be characterized as legitimate remedial legislation.").
184. Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 857.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 857-58 (stating that "the burden is on the challenger of the legislation to
prove that states have not engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional conduct").
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Having clearly placed the burden on the challenger of the legislation, the
court concluded that the FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
D. Comparingthe Rulings: The Depth of the CircuitSplit and the
Importance of Another Eleventh Amendment Ruling by the Supreme
Court

Close examination of the decisions by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
reveals a three-pronged dispute that the Supreme Court must address:
first, whether the definition of the constitutional right is at issue; second,
whether the division is based on the allocation of the burdens of proof;
and third, the proper role of legislative history. 89
Neither the Fifth nor the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disputed the
claim that the goal of the FMLA is to prevent gender discrimination with
respect to employment leave policies.9 The difference between the
courts with respect to the constitutional basis of the right, however,
enabled each court to find varying levels of congruence and to arrive at
opposite conclusions. 9'
The Ninth Circuit's construction of the
constitutional right allowed it to assert that the legislation was congruent
because the burden was on the state to disprove discrimination or
because the statute swept a substantial amount of unconstitutional
behavior within its borders.' 92 Constructing the scope of the right strictly,
as the Fifth Circuit did, compelled the conclusion that the statute is not

188. Id. at 858 ("Consequently we conclude that Congress has validly exercised its
[S]ection 5 power by giving private individuals the fight to sue states for violations of §
2612(a)(1)(C)."). The court, however, provided an alternate holding after reviewing the
very legislative history that it concluded was not required under Kimel. See id. 858-60.
These alternative holdings would seem to suggest that the judges of the Ninth Circuit,
having decided to uphold the FMLA as a valid use of Congress's Section 5 power,
anticipated an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. It seems that using the gender
discrimination issue as the main reason for upholding the law, the Ninth Circuit requested
the Supreme Court to address the distinctions between the FMLA, ADEA, and ADA.
The posture of this case forces the Supreme Court to answer the open question of exactly
how courts are to deal with laws enacted to remedy discrimination that is afforded
constitutional analysis somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational basis.
189. Compare Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted sub nom. Nev. Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mem.),
with Kazimer v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Kimberly E. Dean, Note,
In Light of the Evil Presented: What Kind of Prophylactic Anti-DiscriminationLegislation
Can Congress Enact After Garrett, 43 B.C. L. REV. 697, 730-31 (2002).
190. See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 854-55; Kazmier,225 F.3d at 525.
191. See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858; see also Hartley, supra note 111, at 49 ("If the
legislation contains overbreadth, Congress possesses Section 5 authority to enact it only if
the principal aim of the legislation is to deter or remedy unconstitutional conduct.").
192. Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858-60.
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congruent because it prohibits too much behavior considered
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
The conflict over the allocation of the burden of proof in these cases is
central to understanding the courts' approaches to the issue.' 9
Presuming the legislation unconstitutional, as the Fifth Circuit did, places
the burden on Congress to justify its actions.'95 This burden carries with
it the potential to make legislative findings more important than the text
of the legislation itself.' 6 Conversely, presuming the constitutionality of
a challenged statute does not, as the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hibbs
suggests, rid the courts of the need to review and carefully consider the
legislative record.': The presumption of constitutionality places the

193. See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526,528.
194. See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 857-58; Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526, 529.
195. Compare Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858, with Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526.
196. Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 855-56. Constitutional law scholars and careful observers of
the current Supreme Court will balk at this burden allocation because it appears to be
contrary to the "new textualism," a theory of statutory interpretation that has been
developed and popularized by, among others, Justice Antonin Scalia and Seventh Circuit
Judge Frank Easterbrook. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 74243 (3d ed. 2001). Scholarly attempts to define and characterize this form of statutory
interpretation generally conclude that new textualist theory "posits that once the Court
has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes
irrelevant." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(1990); see also Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L.
REV. 277, 282 (1990). Much of the support for the textualist approach stems from the
formalist opinion in INS v. Chadha,where the Court held that the legislative veto violated
both the bicameralism and presentment clauses contained in Article I. See generally INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Thus, under Chadha formalism, reliance on materials
outside of the text of a statute, such as legislative history, is impermissible "because
Congress has a voice as a constitutional player only through its finally enacted statues, not
through any supplementary explanation thereof." Wald, supra, at 285. For textualists,
therefore, legislative history cannot be utilized unless the plain text of the statute yields
absurd results or is completely ambiguous. See Eskridge, supra, at 654.
Adherence to the rigid formalism of Chadha would seem to create a problem for any
court requiring a close examination of the legislative history in Section 5 cases. Examining
as primary something other than the statutory text, which itself clearly abrogates Eleventh
Amendment immunity, may in itself violate Article I of the Constitution. Because Justice
Scalia, the largest proponent of textualism, has been silent on abrogation issues since his
dissent in Union Gas, however, it is uncertain whether the legislative record requirement
can be justified under this theory of interpretation or whether some other justification for
the legislative record review is required.
197. See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858 ("We find Kazmier's analysis unpersuasive and we
decline to follow it for the reasons we have given. In particular . . . it assumes that
adequate evidentiary support in the legislative history is always a requirement for a valid
exercise of the [S]ection 5 power ... ").
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burden on the state to show that Congress failed in its duty to establish a
clear pattern of unconstitutional behavior.198
The importance of the legislative record, a centerpiece of the Supreme
Court's analysis in Kimel and Garrett, now appears to depend on which
party has the burden of proof.19 In other words, under the Hibbs
analysis, as the legislation at issue becomes more targeted at
constitutionally suspect state actions, the burden of proof shifts from
Congress to the state." In this instance, the likelihood of the legislative
record withstanding scrutiny is greatest; as more suspect behavior is
targeted, the easier it will be to establish a pattern.2' The contrary
approach, taken by Kazmier, holds that if the legislation encompasses a
small amount of constitutional behavior, the burden of proof is on
Congress to justify its actions. 202 In this scenario, the legislative record
becomes the determinative factor for establishing a pattern and achieving
abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity. 2°3 The intricate interplay
between these important factors creates space in the law that the
Supreme Court must attempt to fill in deciding the fate of the FMLA.
This dispute displays all the markings of a potential landmark case in the
area of Congress's ability to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Section 5.

III. BLUNTING THE SWORD: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
UPHOLD THE FMLA OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DECIDE THE ISSUE ON
NARROW CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The intriguing aspect of this case is that, in addition to deciding the
fate of the FMLA's constitutionality, it also sets two series of
constitutional law cases against each other. On one hand, there are cases
that presume state action to be constitutional unless and until individual
rights that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are implicated.2 4
19& Id. at 857-58 ("[T]he burden is on the challenger of legislation to prove that states
have not engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional conduct.").
199. See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858; William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative
Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87, 99 (2001) ("The scope of legislative power depends
in crucial respects on the approach a court takes to determining the existence of such
predicates.").
200. See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858.
201. Id. ("[The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Kazmier] fails to acknowledge the ways in
which the heightened scrutiny to which state-sponsored gender discrimination is subject
justifies shifting or modifying the burden of proof in the legislative history inquiry.").
202. See Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2000).
203. Id. ("[W]e examine, at Kimel's second step, the legislative record of the statute
under review to see whether it contains evidence of actual constitutionalviolations by the
States sufficient to justify the full scope of the statute's provisions.").
204. See supra note 201.
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On the other hand, there is a line of recent sovereign immunity cases
restricting congressional action favoring state sovereignty over individual
civil rights.0 5 Given the heightened importance of the Hibbs case, the
scope and rationale of the Court's decision are as important, if not more
important, than its eventual holding.
A. The Constitutionalityof the FMLA: DistinguishingGender
DiscriminationFrom Age and DisabilityDiscrimination
The principal argument advanced against the FMLA is that it fails the
congruence and proportionality test established in City of Boerne and
relied upon in both Kimel and Garrett.2 As the Ninth Circuit argued in
Hibbs, however, the FMLA was enacted to combat gender
discrimination, a form of discrimination that receives more constitutional
protection than either age or disability discrimination."" This distinction
is significant if the Supreme Court is willing to do three things. First, the
Supreme Court must be willing to find that a form of discrimination
receiving heightened scrutiny justifies an expansion of Congress's Section
5 power.2 s Second, the Court must conclude that the FMLA is in fact
aimed at attacking gender discrimination by the states in employment.
Third, irrespective of the level of scrutiny, the Court must be willing to
locate support within the legislative record to substantiate the claim that
the states were engaged in sufficient unconstitutional behavior to justify
federal legislation.""
A review of Court precedent and its application to the FMLA
indicates that, although the FMLA might survive the first two steps of
this analysis, the legislation will likely fail the third step. To make this
point clear, imagine that Congress's Section 5 power is a set of three
glasses: one very small (8 oz.); one medium-sized (24 oz.); and one quite
large (32 oz.). Each glass represents Congress's ability to establish the

205. See infra note 241.
206. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-82 (2000); see also Brief for the Petitioner at 18-19,
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs (No. 01-1368).
207. Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub
nom. Nev. Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mein.) (reporting
that the United States defended "the constitutionality of the FMLA on the ground that it
is aimed at remedying and preventing gender discrimination, and gender discrimination is
subject to heightened scrutiny").
20& See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84 (stating that "when a State discriminates on the basis of
race or gender, we require a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the
legitimate ends they serve") (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
209. See Florida Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 639 (1999); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
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necessary "pattern" with respect to various forms of discrimination. The
smallest glass represents the vessel used in the holdings of Kimel and
When the discrimination combated is not subject to
Garrett.21
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, Congress's
ability is truncated because very little of the behavior prohibited by the
Most of the incidents in the legislative
statute is unconstitutional.
record fall outside the smallest glass.
The largest glass is also consistent with Kimel and Garrett, as well as
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and the line of voting rights cases.12 When the
scrutiny is strict, more statutorily-prohibited behavior is unconstitutional,
in
so the congressional vessel is more likely to capture events described
2 '3
the legislative record; a "pattern" is thus more easily established.
Precedent now leaves the medium-sized glass - and an open question
regarding the corresponding ability of Congress to establish the
necessary "pattern" of violations by the states when the discrimination
combated is subject to intermediate or heightened scrutiny.1 Presenting
the issue in this manner seems to require that the Court address the
following question: is heightened scrutiny closer to strict scrutiny or
rational basis? While either outcome can be rationally supported, case
215
law seems to suggest that heightened scrutiny is closer to strict scrutiny,
210. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 373-74 (comparing the ADA unfavorably to the Voting

Rights Act of 1965); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90-91.
211. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 ("States are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions
towards such individuals are rational."); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 ("States may discriminate
on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification
in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
212. See Garrett,531 U.S. at 373-74; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308 (1966).
213. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 ("There can be no doubt that this line of cases has
sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War Amendments, into the
judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
States.").
214. Some scholars, however, have argued that "the scope of congressional power thus
turns not on whether a classification is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, but on
whether, at least sometimes, state action based on such a classification results in
unconstitutional conduct." Thomas W. Beimers, Searching for the Structural Vision of
City of Boerne v. Flores: Vertical and Horizontal Tensions in the New Constitutional
Architecture, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 789, 811 (1999) (citing Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160
F.3d 389,391-92 (7th Cir. 1998)).
215. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1998). Many scholars have
concluded that the majority opinion in Virginia placed heightened scrutiny closer to strict
scrutiny. See Steven A. Delchin, United States v. Virginia and Our Evolving
"Constitution": Playing Peek-a-boo With the Standard of Scrutiny for Sex-Based
Classifications,47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1121, 1154 (1997) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg
moved the standard of review toward strict scrutiny in gender discrimination cases, in part
as a response to the changing role of men and women in society); Christina Gleason,
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thereby supporting a greater view of congressional power under Section
5.216 Even a victory for the FMLA at this threshold stage, however, does
not automatically save the legislation from being found unconstitutional.
The next hurdle the FMLA faces is more practical than theoretical: is
the legislation's aim truly to combat unconstitutional discrimination
based on gender? Statements of Congress notwithstanding,

7

the answer

to this question depends on evidence of a "pattern" of unconstitutional
discrimination by the states. The FMLA provides leave for four different
categories: the birth or care of a child,218 the placement of a child with the
employee for adoption or foster care, care for certain family
members, 20 or serious health conditions of the employee. 22' The first of

these provisions, regarding pregnancy, is limited to women, thereby
making the possibility of disparate treatment possible. The remaining

three provisions, however, do not involve anything that requires, or even
hints at, the possibility of differentiation between men and women.
While general stereotypes about the respective roles of men and women
might bring the FMLA within the boundaries of the Fourteenth
Amendment,2 defenders of the FMLA must address the case of
Geduldig v. Aiello, a substantial legal impediment. 2 " Geduldig stands for

the proposition that disparate treatment for normal pregnancy is not a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 To the extent that this
remains good law today, it presents a serious obstacle for the
constitutionality of the FMLA.2 5
Comment, United States v. Virginia: Skeptical Scrutiny and the Future of Gender
Discrimination Law, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 801, 809 (1996) (arguing that, although the

majority opinion did not change gender classification review from heightened scrutiny to
strict scrutiny, the Court did move closer towards strict scrutiny as part of a long-term
plan); Collin 0. Udell, Note, Signaling a New Direction in Gender Classification Scrutiny:
United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1996) (arguing that the majority's
decision in United States v. Virginia has moved the Court closer to a strict scrutiny
standard for classifications based on gender).
216. See Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 455-56.

217. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2000); see also supra notes 146-49.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (2000).
219. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B).
220. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
221. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
222. See supra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
223. 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that the denial of insurance benefits for work loss
resulting from normal pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
224. Id. at 497.
225. While Geduldig has never been overruled, its value as precedent in a case with
different facts is minimal. While Geduldig stands for the proposition that the denial of
insurance coverage for disabilities resulting from pregnancy was not discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court recognized that "it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification." Id. at 496
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For the FMLA to survive judicial scrutiny and be considered
legislation aimed at combating unconstitutional gender discrimination,
the legislation must overcome an exacting review of its legislative record.
This record is what the Court consults to ascertain the "aim" of
legislation by scanning for a "pattern" of constitutional violations by the
states."6 Given the analysis provided by the Fifth Circuit in Kazmier,t7
combined with the fact that the Ninth Circuit addressed this issue as its
alternate holding, m the likelihood of success on this prong of the analysis
is slim. While the possibility remains that, like the Ninth Circuit,2 9 the
Supreme Court will reduce the evidentiary requirements for legislation
combating gender discrimination, this possibility does not appear to be
likely. If the standards for congruence and proportionality are the
legislative histories of monumental legislation such as the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, M this portion of the analysis becomes a kill-all that would
n.20. Therefore, some legislative enactments may qualify as gender discrimination.
Justice Stevens recognized this principle when he stated, "Nor should Geduldig be
understood as holding that, as a matter of law, pregnancy-based classifications never
violate the Equal Protection Clause." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 327 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the Court has held that policies involving
pregnancy violate Title VII. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). In Satty,
the Court held that an employer's policy of not granting seniority to women returning
from pregnancy leave burdened women only and thus violated Title VII. Id. at 142. An
analysis of the benefits and burdens in Satty was determinative of the outcome. Id. The
Court held that "[t]he distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of
semantics." Id. Thus, if there are burdens imposed on women by the legislation
concerning pregnancy that are not imposed on men, the legislation may violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In light of the holding in Satty, the government may be able to argue that the
provisions of the FMLA dealing with maternity leave are necessary to prevent burdens
from being imposed upon women employed by the states. If women, because of
pregnancy, are denied leave benefits and are forced to adjust their work schedules, pay
rates, or seniority status, they are suffering unconstitutional burdens that can be corrected
by congressional action. The unconstitutional behavior to be corrected is not pregnancybased discrimination, but the unconstitutional burdens placed on women forced to take
leave to give birth to a child. An argument of this type might allow the Court to preserve
the ruling in Geduldig with respect to situations where the burdens are equal, while at the
same time allowing the provision in the FMLA to be considered combative of gender
discrimination.
226. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,368 (2001).
227. Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519,526-27 (5th Cir. 2000).
22& See Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Resources, 273 F.3d 844, 858-71 (2001), cert granted
sub nom Nev. Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mem.).
229. See id. at 857-58.
230. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973bb-1).
In Garrett,the Court referenced the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as
the benchmark for congruence and proportionality. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 358 ("The
ADA's constitutional shortcomings are apparent when it is compared to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.").
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have the effect of destroying any federal legislation enacted under

Section 5 that does not combat racial discrimination or discrimination
against "discrete and insular minorities."'Whether the FMLA prevails or is struck down, however, is only half of
what makes this case potentially revolutionary. The grounds on which
the decision is based could have a drastic impact on other litigation

involving Section 5 legislation.
B. Shifting the Presumptions of Constitutionality:The Key to Unlocking
the Court's Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence

If the issue in Hibbs were limited to the constitutionality of one federal
statute, it would not be of great interest to constitutional scholars. The

nature of the underlying dispute, however, gives Hibbs the capacity to be
a tremendously interesting and highly controversial decision. Beneath
the superficial concerns regarding Congress's ability to enact the FMLA
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, this case addresses the
very intriguing question of, not what the parties have to prove, but who
has the burden of proof. 32 The "presumption of constitutionality" is
critical to many constitutional decisions. '3'This presumption serves to
assign the burden of proof in a constitutional dispute.2- For example,
when a state government enacts legislation, the law is presumed to be

constitutional until the challenger of the statute can convince a court that
231. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In one of
the most famous Supreme Court footnotes, Justice Harlan F. Stone, discussing the various
standards of review, indicated that a stricter review ought to be considered when the case
involves certain kinds of legislation. Justice Stone stated:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
232. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
233. See generally Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court. A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
234. Id.
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the law violates a provision of the Constitution. 35 Under current
constitutional law the presumption shifts only when fundamental

constitutional rights are violated or when a classification is suspect.2

In

cases involving these two categories, the presumption is reversed; the

state law is presumed to be unconstitutional and the state, not the
individual challenger, has the burden of showing that the law is narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest 7 Thus, one could

say that the difference between the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests
is that under rational basis the state enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality, while under strict scrutiny it does not. In other words,
fundamental rights and suspect classifications serve to trump the states'
presumption of constitutionality. When the state law deals directly with
one of these areas, the presumption is automatically rebutted, and the
state is placed in the position of defending its actions.
Applying this presumption analysis to the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court's holdings since City of Boerne
have effectively removed the presumption of constitutionality given to
legislation that seeks to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.
In each of the post-City of Boerne cases, 23 the Court has required,
through the exacting application of the congruence and proportionality
test, that Congress prove, via the legislative record, that the states have
235. See id. at 19-20. Professor Gunther argued:
[The Equal Protection Clause] permits the States a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.

Id.
236. See Gordon G. Young, A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on
Congress's Power to Restrict the Jurisdictionof the Lower Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV.
132, 180 n.252 (1995) (stating that "the Court nearly conclusively presumes the
reasonableness of any legislative classification which involves neither suspect
classifications nor fundamental rights").
237. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 56, 88 (1997) ("In these vast doctrinal areas, statutes and policies that classify on
suspect bases or infringe on fundamental rights are strongly presumptively
unconstitutional; they can be upheld only if necessary to serve a compelling governmental
interest.").
238. See id. (stating that "statutes and policies outside the suspect category enjoy a
robust presumption of constitutionality under traditional rational basis review").
239. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding the ADA
of 1990 unconstitutional); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding the
ADEA of 1967 unconstitutional); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding the Patent Act of 1992 unconstitutional).
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engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional behavior sufficient to justify
enacting Section 5 legislation.2 Generally speaking, therefore, Congress
enjoys a presumption of constitutionality when legislating except when
the legislation intrudes into the sovereign immunity of the states.24'
When Congress intrudes upon sovereign immunity, the presumption is
shifted against Congress and in favor of the state. In other words, the
Court seemingly has added sovereign immunity to suspect classification
and fundamental rights to the list of areas of law shifting the presumption
of constitutionality.
All of this is by way of establishing the issues apparently in play for the
Court in Hibbs. If sovereign immunity indeed triggers a presumption
shift in favor of the states, and the intrusion into fundamental rights
triggers a presumption shift against the states, what happens to the
burdens of proof when Congress intrudes upon sovereign immunity to
protect a fundamental right? To address the split between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits effectively, 242 in deciding the Hibbs case, the Supreme
Court must address the tension between these two conflicting doctrines.
If the Court finds, with the Ninth Circuit, that the burden of proof rests
with the challenging state, then the state must demonstrate that at the
time of the FMLA's enactment, it was not engaging in a pattern of
discrimination that would have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 243
A decision of this nature would have the effect of diminishing the
importance of the FM!LA's legislative record because Congress would
not be required to have established a pattern of constitutional violations.
On the other hand, a decision reversing the Ninth Circuit returns the
focus to Congress's legislative record and strengthens the Eleventh
Amendment's position as tantamount to a fundamental right. Equating
the Eleventh Amendment's principles of sovereign immunity with
fundamental rights sharpens the sword and encourages more states to
wield their sword against legislation that purports to abrogate sovereign
immunity under Section 5.

240. See supra note 239.
241. See Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State
Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 286-87 (2002)
(arguing that the Court has elevated the sovereign immunity of the states to a status equal
to that enjoyed by fundamental rights).
242 Compare Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 533 (5th Cir. 2000), with Hibbs v.
Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Nev.
Dep't of Human Res. v Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mem.).
243. See Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 858.
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C. Section 5 v. The Eleventh Amendment: The FutureBattle Grounds

A cursory review of the case law that has pitted Section 5 legislation
against Eleventh Amendment concerns reveals the subtle fact that since
City of Boerne, every Section 5 case that has been decided utilizing the
2 44
congruence and proportionality test has been found unconstitutional.
A closer examination of these cases finds that the general basis for
holding the legislation unconstitutional has been the lack of evidence of
discrimination in the legislative history2 45 The fact that each of these
congressional enactments occurred before 1995, the year in which City of
Boerne was decided, presents two constitutional concerns. The first
concern is whether "on the record" review of Section 5 legislation is
constitutional. 246 The second concern is whether the City of Boerne test
can, and should, be applied to legislation retroactively. 247 In other words,
before
can the Court apply the heightened standard to bills enacted
28
Congress was aware of the legislative record requirements?

244. See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(holding the ADA of 1990 unconstitutional); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000) (holding the ADEA of 1967 unconstitutional); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding the Patent Act of 1992
unconstitutional); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1995) (holding the RFRA of
1994 unconstitutional).
245. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-70; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at
646-47; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
246. Bryant & Simeone, supra note 126, at 369-70. Bryant and Simeone argue that the
new standard of review should not apply to Congress because
[t]he Court's imposition of new, procedural conditions on Congress's exercise of
its legislative authority raises substantial constitutional questions under the Rules
and Journal Clauses, the Speech or Debate Clause, and the political question
doctrine, [and the] new approach is simply inconsistent with the realities of
congressional fact-finding as envisioned by the Constitution.
Id.; see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 199, at 90 (stating that legislative record
review "threatens to impose procedural and substantive constraints on legislative action
that have no support in precedent or in constitutional text or structure").
247. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change:An EquilibriumApproach, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1075-79 (1997). Fisch addresses the common argument that Article
III requires adjudication, by its very nature, to be retroactive. Id. at 1079. For support of
this principal, Fisch looks to Justice Scalia's position that "[f]ully retroactive
decisionmaking [is] considered a principal distinction between the judicial and the
legislative power." Id. at 1076 (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
248. Bryant & Simeone, supra note 126, at 370-83. Bryant and Simeone raise two
constitutional concerns regarding the close review of Congress's work by the Court. Id. at
373. First, it is unclear whether "the Court's now well-established authority to review
statutes supplies any affirmative grant of power for the Court to influence Congress's
deliberation prior to enacting a law." Id. Second, they argue that "the Constitution itself
both expressly and implicitly imposes limits on judicial intrusion into the workings of
Congress." Id.
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The fact that, facially, the Hibbs case and the FMLA are
distinguishable from previous cases presents the Court with the
opportunity to refine its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.249 This
refinement can take either a narrow scope or a broad scope. The narrow
possibility is identical to that suggested and implored by the Ninth
Circuit.250 The Court could hold that with respect to legislation
combating discrimination that receives heightened scrutiny, the burdenshifting analysis alleviates the need to review the legislative record with
exacting scrutiny. Thus, the Court could base its holding entirely on
whether the FMLA combats gender discrimination. If it does, there
would be limited review of the legislative record; if it does not, the Court
will follow the precedent established by Kimel and Garrett. Either way,
the congruence and proportionality test would remain unaltered. This
would permit Congress to retain Section 5 power under both strict and
heightened scrutiny, while still allowing the states their sovereign
immunity from laws combating discrimination that receive only rational
basis review.
If the Court holds, however, that gender discrimination is subject to
heightened scrutiny and that the legislative record review must be
performed, the holding is on broad grounds, and Congress will not
receive added protection to legislate under Section 5. A broad holding of
this type completely tilts the balance in favor of states' rights and the
Eleventh Amendment. Congress would lose power to legislate in both
rational basis and heightened scrutiny situations, and Section 5 would be
limited to combat discrimination based on race.
IV. CONCLUSION

As is not uncommon, because of the complicated, esoteric nature of
this case, the decision, regardless of its outcome, will go largely unnoticed
by the vast majority of the American people. The success or failure of
the FMLA as it relates to state employees is not a headline-making
Supreme Court decision. Nevertheless, the implications, when fully

249. See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text. The Court had another
opportunity during the October 2002 term to refine its Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence with the case of Medical Board of California v. Hanson. Charles Lane,
Justices Agree To Review DisabilitiesAct Protections:States Rights at Issue in Calif.Case of
Mentally Ill Doctor, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2002, at A12. The case was to address a
question left unanswered in Garrett: whether states could be sued in federal courts for
money damages for discrimination with respect to public services. Id. Oral argument,
however, was cancelled at the State of California's request, and the case is currently in
limbo. Bob Egelko, High Court Tables DisabilityCase, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 2003, at A3.
250. See Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
grantedsub nom Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mem.).
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analyzed, will affect the rights and duties of both state governments and
individual government employees.
State sovereign immunity is a powerful weapon that should be wielded
carefully and only in cases where absolutely necessary. To continue to
allow states to assert sovereign immunity against federal statutes
providing money damage remedies represents a dangerous precedent
that provides states with a sharp sword that can be used to slice out
popular federal legislation with no regard for the individual citizen who is
harmed and without remedy. The balance between state and federal
power, between Section 5 and the Eleventh Amendment, is a delicate
one whose advantages should never favor one group over the other.
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